Introduction
The UK's automotive industry has been one of the 'star performers' of the UK economy in recent years -unlike many other manufacturing sectors. Output has increased by 60% since 2010 and there has been over £8bn worth of investment in the industry in the last four years (SMMT, 2016) . The industry supports some 800,000 jobs in total in the UK. This upturn has benefitted regions, such as the West Midlands which have struggled with deindustrialisation, plant closures and the legacy of the global financial crisis (Bailey and Berkeley, 2014; Bailey et al 2015; 1 Acknowledgement: The writing of this chapter has in part been supported by the EU Horizon 2020 project MAKERS -Smart Manufacturing for EU growth and prosperity, a project funded by the Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Staff Exchange Programme, under the Marie SklodowskaCurie Actions, grant agreement number 691192. 2 Corresponding author: d.bailey@aston.ac.uk based auto assemblers, this depreciation should boost exports. In response to this, firms have a choice between increasing output and increasing prices to raise margins. Nevertheless, this should help boost UK auto output in the short term to over 1.8m units. 4 So the immediate likely impact on UK auto would seem to be 'output up but domestic sales down'.
At the same time, however, imported cars and components will become more expensive for the consumer and industry alike. On average, only around 40% of the components that comprise a UK assembled car are sourced locally, as against 60%
in Germany (SMMT, 2016) , given the nature of fragmented supply chains in UK automotive (Bailey and De Propris, 2014) . By late 2016 the exchange rate depreciation was already feeding through into inflation, especially in relation to imported components and factory input prices. 5 Such forces will impact on different firms in different ways. Jaguar Land Rover, for example, source a higher proportion of components in the UK and also have higher margins to play with than, say,
General Motors through its Vauxhall brand. Both firms have worked hard in recent
years to raise their levels of UK sourcing. That could become an imperative if sterling settles down at a lower exchange rate and imported components become too costly.
Those auto brands that do not assemble in the UK and only import cars will be negatively affected by the fall in sterling as their cars will become more expensive here (or their margins will be squeezed). So in terms of the auto market in the UK, the 'bottom line' is that cars (whether imported or made in the UK) are likely to become more expensive. 6 And as noted, a slowdown in economic growth is also likely, which will impact on car sales.
Uncertainty and FDI
There are a number of ways in which Brexit could impact on FDI flows to the UKwhether from the EU or beyond (Dhingra et al, 2016; Driffield and Karoglou, 2016) .
Firstly, like other manufacturing industries, car production is fragmented along global 4 As noted, a weak UK currency (sterling) might offer an export advantage, if it persists over time, but in low-margin manufacturing such as mass market auto, currency fluctuations may be seen as a negative strategic factor for investors (LMC, 2016b) . 5 The Office for National Statistics stated in August 2016 that input prices rose 4.3% in July 2016, the first annual increase since September 2013 (Financial Times, 16/08/2016) . 6 Dhingra et al (2016) suggest that UK car prices could rise by 2.5% after Brexit.
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Secondly, FDI-flows into the UK have been used as a platform to access the EU Single Market, with multinationals benefitting from the elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers. This may change if the terms of trade with the EU are re-drawn.
Indeed, ongoing uncertainty over the nature of future trading relations between the UK and the EU is likely to affect inward investment in the industry in the UK. Foreign investment has been key to the renewal of the industry, with some £8bn invested in the sector over the last five years (SMMT, 2016).
As Driffield and Karoglou (2016) note, the biggest single deterrent to foreign investment is uncertainty. The more uncertainty that firms attach to their 'net present value calculations', the less likely they are to invest. They note that the single event that caused the greatest decline in inward investment in recent history was Britain leaving the Exchange Rate Mechanism, not because it necessarily implied any particular weakness about the UK economy, but because of the uncertainty that surrounded it. In contrast, they note that the single event that has had the greatest positive impact on inward investment in the UK in recent history was the creation of the single market. This was because it became easier for firms to conduct business within their organization across national borders. For example, automotive and engine assemblers like GM, BMW and Ford all import sizeable inflows of components to the UK from their other EU operations and from the broader value chain.
The key point here is that trade is no longer bilateral between countries; rather trade is characterized by fine grained cross-border value chains where the end product incorporates inputs from multiple origins. Indeed, industrial production today occurs through the veins of global production networks (Coe and Yeung, 2015) that span borders and are headed by multinationals (some of which are starting to originate from emerging economies such as China; Matthews, 2006) . The global value chain
Final author copy for David Bailey and Leslie Budd (ed.s) The Political Economy of Brexit. Agenda Publishing. Forthcoming 2017. 5 (GVC) model suggests that not all stages of production contribute with the same value added to the final product (Gereffi et al 2006) . As KPMG (2014) illustrate, a typical driveline system produced by GKN, the British-based supplier of automotive driveline technologies and systems, incorporates specialist forged parts from Spain, Italy, France and Germany which are then assembled at GKN Driveline's UK factory and supplied to automotive assemblers in the UK and EU. This is illustrated in Figure   1 below. 7 The components, assembled drivelines and the then final assembled car could cross the English Channel several times. As noted above, these value chains need to be 'frictionless' in terms of non-tariff barriers (think of regulations and standards) as well as tariffs. As KPMG (2016: 13) noted before the vote: (SMMT, 2016b) . A tariff of 10% on completed cars would represent a considerable burden for the mass industry and would represent far more than the total of wages and profits in the industry (Holmes, 2016) .
On trading arrangements post-Brexit, during the referendum campaign, some suggested that Norway and Switzerland are examples that could be followed, as they are outside of the EU and enjoy forms of free trade with the EU. Switzerland's position is somewhat complicated and based on a number of bilateral agreements.
Some sectors of its economy are not covered (services, for example). It's a kind of ala-carte 'Swiss Cheese' approach. Like Switzerland, Norway pays into the EU budget and gets access to the single market (on a comprehensive basis in its case), but must follow EU rules and has no input into devising EU regulations. In both cases, they are free to negotiate trade deals independently of the EU. So, could the UK 'do a Norway' and stay in the single market? That would minimize the economic damage of leaving the EU, but will be tricky given that the Leave campaign had immigration as a core issue. Complete freedom of movement for people in the single market is likely to be a sticking point for the UK, as might be paying into the EU budget.
Of course, some auto firms based in mainland Europe will want to continue to trade with the UK (the UK is BMW's second largest market in Europe for example) and are already taking a hit on exports to the UK with the depreciation of sterling. There will be some desire to get a deal of sorts done. 8 Yet completely free trade on all goods and services (as now) but without paying into the EU budget or agreeing to the free movement of people is probably going to be a non-starter. A deal will have to be done, but the compromise will take some time to sort out, and that uncertainty is itself a major risk in terms of inward foreign investment in the auto industry. So there is uncertainty, and industry is uncertain as to how long it will go on.
As Holmes (2016) notes, there are practical difficulties to be overcome with sectoral deals for industries like auto. A full Free Trade Agreement (FTA) would make exported cars free of tariffs into the EU, but to benefit from this they need to meet the EU's FTA Rules of Origin. Currently, these require 60% of a car's value added to be 'local' to benefit from the FTA (or with parts and components from the EU under a so-called 'cumulation' agreement). So to eliminate border bureaucracy there would need to be a customs union arrangement and a Mutual Recognition agreement for conformity assessment. However, to ensure automatic mutual recognition of the UK's conformity assessment, EEA states have to accept supranational enforcement.
This could violate a UK 'red line' in Brexit talks. One possibility would be to sign a special FTA agreement in which both sides agreed that in industries where the UK keeps the same external tariffs as the EU's common external tariff then rules of origin would not be checked. As Holmes (2016) notes, such a deal is imaginable in cars because both sides have an interest in maintaining value chains in the sector.
Firm Specific impacts
The switching of assembly location mid-cycle for models currently made in the UK is not likely given high 'double running' costs in tooling and logistics. What is much more likely, though, is a shift of assembly at the point of model replacement or when new models are launched (LMC, 2016b) . Companies assessing their assembly location will consider a range of issues in making such decisions, including:
 The relative cost differences between UK and EU locations; Uncertainty in particular over the possibility of tariffs places a question mark over the future of a number of UK plants and jobs. Furthermore, as supply chain investment moves with assemblers' volumes, there could be a broader knock-on effect. It should also be noted that automotive technology is changing rapidly with developments in electric cars, connected cars and autonomous (driver-less) cars. As LMC (2016) note, a lack of FDI in such new technologies could have "a long term impact on the competitiveness of the UK industry."
A major risk facing UK auto is that investment decisions for the launch of new vehicle models are made several years in advance, often with plants engaged in 'locational tournaments' to win contracts to build the new models. For many companies those decisions are set to be made in the middle of Brexit negotiations which are anticipated to last two years (e.g. Article 50 activated in 2017 with a two year negotiation). As LMC (2016b) notes, "new investment initiatives in the UK, such as expansion of current manufacturing activity, or new capacity for manufacturers that process and how this could impact on Japanese investment in the UK (Government of Japan, 2016). The Japanese government's memorandum has emphasised the need for the UK to retain maximum contact with the Single Market and maintain free movement of worker between the UK and EU. The Japanese Ambassador to the UK has warned that Japanese firms could disinvest from the UK if Brexit meant that they could not make sufficient profits .
Nissan itself initially stated that it would defer decisions on where to build new generations of models currently assembled at its Sunderland plant, with the RenaultNissan CEO Carlos Ghosn stating "important investment decisions will not be made While firms like Nissan will certainly face challenges if the UK does not have the access to the Single Market, manufacturers may also try to use uncertainty as an excuse to cut capacity in the UK as part of wider efforts to reduce over-capacity in Europe (especially so given how easy it is to lay off workers in the UK compared with 
Other impacts
Even with a trade deal, there is one area where UK auto will definitely lose out, and that is via the ability to influence regulation in the industry. Regulation is not going away and if anything will be become more important as we move towards connected and autonomous cars. The UK will have no influence on shaping those regulations in Europe when it leaves. Jaguar Land Rover, for example, will have to look to the Slovakian government to represent it at the European level when the UK does exit (given that it is investing in an assembly plant in Slovakia).
A second possible impact centres on the availability of skilled workers. The auto industry currently has some 5,000 vacancies and needs to be able to hire skilled workers from Europe (SMMT, 2016). Again, this needs to be sorted out as quickly as possible. The extent to which automotive firms in the UK are affected by controls on immigration will, of course, depend on the nature of any new rules. One option could be to extend current rules for non-EU/EEA nationals to all non-UK nationals (House of Commons Library, 2016). This would effectively restrict economic migration to highly skilled migrants, reducing the inflow of migrant workers doing low-skilled jobs. Market needs to be maintained. As the EEF (2016) notes, the UK must be prepared to make a contribution to the EU in order to achieve this. Secondly, maintaining the skills base is critical -this includes enabling UK auto to hire skilled workers from Europe. Thirdly, and linked to the first point, regulatory cooperation with the EU needs to be ensured. Finally, measures need to be taken to underpin investment in the UK, boost productivity and to develop an effective industrial strategy (on the latter see Bailey et al, 2015) .
Industrial Policy needs
Britain needs to more than just strike a new trade deal with the EU. For example, British government will need to do much more to create and develop its own skills; Statements over 2010-2015 about rebalancing the economy and a "march of the makers", but little was delivered in reality. Some support was made available to rebuilding the UK's fractured supply chains and to encouraging 'rebalancing' but the sums on offer were small and failed to match the scale of the rhetoric. Indeed, the manufacturing recovery since the financial crisis has been weak, characterised by concerns over its durability centred on fragility in key export markets, low levels of investment spending, concerns over the impact of high energy costs across the sector, and issues of skills and access to finance down the supply chain.
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14 The last government did away with the old regional development authorities and replaced them with the local enterprise partnerships (LEPs). The intention of devolving more power to ground level was laudable, but in practice many powers were initially recentralised and LEPs had insufficient funding anyway. Their performance has been very mixed. While LEPs in Birmingham and the Black Country have received praise, further afield there is a question mark as to how much LEPs are really doing. In particular, they lack the regional scale to support wider development. In addition, the coalition government was slow to address the problems that small businesses face in raising finance, largely because the banks are now much more risk-averse. These companies are crucial to industrial supply chains, and this is an area that still requires attention. Recent governments have also made no attempt to address the UK's lax takeover rules, which do little to protect strategically important businesses from foreign predators, in contrast with approaches taken in some other countries (Singh et al, 2015) .
On the positive side, the Cameron government did introduce a series of so-called Catapults. These are centres where businesses, engineers and scientists work together on late-stage research and development. The different catapults are each dedicated to different priority areas such as high-value manufacturing, transport systems and offshore renewables. They are about long-term sector development, so it is still too early to judge them, but they look like the right sort of intervention.
Equally encouraging has been the work of the Automotive Council, which started at the end of the Labour administration and which developed under Vince Cable into an effective body in fostering public -private cooperation and discovering knowledge in terms of challenges and opportunities. The Council's work has, for example, set out clear priorities for key automotive technologies that need to be developed (such as on powertrains, lightweighting and intelligent mobility) which has both aligned government support and funding and has underpinned business confidence and investment.
More recently, though, Sajid Javid's tenure as Business Secretary was disappointing. His immediate decision to sell off a majority stake in the Green Investment Bank raised questions about the government's commitment to the low rules. Finally, the government appears to have reiterated its support to the auto industry through the industrial strategy is now developing, on issues like skills, innovation and reshoring the supply chain. The latter is welcome, and is something of a major U-turn as compared with the reign of the previous Business Secretary Sajid Javid (as noted above).
More broadly, however, there is a strong case for UK industrial strategy to be afforded an institutional status similar to both UK monetary and fiscal policies. At the very least, it should be the subject of regular strategic long-term reviews. By giving it that sort of priority, the new government would send out the kind of powerful message that British industry and foreign investors need to hear. On a positive note, the new Business Secretary is perhaps unique in government in bringing with him a welcome devolving instinct (witness his efforts at 'city deals') that offers the possibility to join up sectoral policy at the national level with place based policy at the regional level. However, let's hope the new government really is more serious about the need to rebalance the economy than the last one. More rhetoric about the 'March of the Makers' won't be enough.
Conclusions
The UK's automotive sector has been successful in recent years in growing output and -to a more limited degree -in sourcing more components locally. Brexit brings both opportunities and challenges to the industry and it is important that these are tackled effectively so that the industry can continue to thrive. The Brexit vote, for example, leaves considerable uncertainty over the nature of the UK's trading relationship with the EU. That uncertainty has the potential to impact on foreign investment in the UK auto sector, especially when auto firms are looking to replace models. While Nissan has made a decision to build the next generation Qashqai and
XTrail models at Sunderland, other firms may hold off making decisions on assembly in the UK until they knows whether they will face tariffs when exporting to the EU.
Plants and jobs could be at risk if such uncertainty isn't 'nailed down' quickly in the form of clear parameters for a trade deal -and preferably one that is as close as possible to existing Single Market arrangements. On this there is much more that the government could be doing in really trying to counter this uncertainty, for example by prioritising as part of the Brexit negotiations access to the Single Market and ensuring that UK firms can hire skilled workers from Europe.
The UK also needs to do more than agree a new trading relationship with Europe It needs a new industrial strategy both to offset Brexit induced uncertainty and to 'rebalance' the economy, for example by stimulating investment in manufacturing such as through enhanced capital allowances, by resurrecting something like the Advanced Manufacturing Supply Chain Initiative (preferably on a much wider scale), and by plugging funding gaps for small firms in the supply chain. There is the opportunity to 'reshore' more of the auto components industry if sterling settles down at a new, lower exchange rate. That is not going to happen automatically, though,
given the barriers to reshoring noted above, and an effective industrial strategy is required to push this along. It should also be noted that the industry is undergoing profound changes, with shifts towards electrification, and connected and autonomous (driver-less) cars. A committed industrial strategy will be needed to underpin private sector investment in such technologies, a point which Jaguar Land Rover has been keen to stress regarding its aspiration to build electric vehicles in the UK (Bailey, 2016) . On this we await more details from the government's new industrial strategy. More broadly, there is a strong case for UK industrial strategy to be afforded an institutional status similar to both UK monetary and fiscal policies. At the very least, it should be the subject of regular strategic long-term reviews. By giving it that sort of priority, the new government would send out the kind of powerful message that British industry and foreign investors need to hear. The key point is that given both opportunities and risks arising from Brexit for UK auto, a better funded and more active industrial strategy is now needed to support UK auto and manufacturing.
